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Language, operatory thought and intuition
Language is generous: it allows us to communicate and thereby to undertake tasks we could not even image when left on our non-communicative own. Even when left on our own, the tool of auto-communication gives us insights we would never be able to attain without the support of language. In Piagetian terms, language is essential for the passage from sensori-motor to operatory cognition; moreover, the possession of operatory thought at one level allows our intuition to work at further levels it could never reach when based on sensori-motor cognition and non-operatory language alone (as the situation was, for all of us, between roughly two and six years). 1 1 For my interpretation of Piaget's thought (and for the particular emphasis on the notions of familiarity and concreteness) I refer to [Høyrup 2000a: 235-255] .
A short example may serve to familiarize with the essential notions. Time and again, Piaget refers to this problem:
(1) Edith is fairer than Susan.
(2) Edith is darker than Lily. Who is darkest? The problem was one of those which appeared in the IQ-tests designed by Cyril Burt (tests which the young Piaget re-standardized for a Swizz environment) and one of those which made Piaget discover that the "errors" of young children were not mere errors but symptoms of a different way to organize thought. As told by Piaget, the child of ten will typically argue that both Edith and Susan are fair, while both Edith and Lily are dark. Edith must thus be in between, Lily must be darkest, and Susan is fairest. For such complex matters, the thought of the child is still intuitive, and it argues from the way language distributes objects in categories ("fair"/"dark"). Only at (typically) twelve will the child be as familiar with the mutual relations between the categories expressed by language as it is since the age of 2-3 with those between (say) boxes of different size that can be fitted into each other. Now it may, for example, invert the first statement into "Susan is darker than Edith" -its thinking has become operatory even for questions of this kind.
Language creates a wholly new ontology, consisting of entities that can only be experienced, together with their properties and the network of relations within which they are spun, through their linguistic realization. Though they receive part of their emotional loading from non-linguistic sources -in part non-linguistic symbols, in part directly lived experience -none of those ideals and imagined communities for which (and in whose name) some of us kill and others die exist without the mediation of language.
Mathematics, an artificial language par excellence, 2 is also generous; directly, and through its service for sciences concerned with material reality, it has increased the efficiency of this same killing (and of most of human technological practice in general) immensely; 3 it has done so in particular since the innovations in symbolism of the Early Modern epoch allowed mathematical thought to emulate the grammar of natural language freely [Høyrup 2000b] . A different aspect of the efficiency of the mathematical language is that the familiarity with very abstract objects with which it provides us allows the intuition of the mathematically trained to go at least one step beyond that which is safely established and meaningful, and often to do so in a way which is vindicated by later developments.
Oft-discussed instances of this are the introduction of complex numbers and the infinitesimal calculus in Leibnizian formulation, the former "guaranteed" by the applicability of the rules of algebra as known to Cardano (and, in more mature versions, by later generations), the second by the arithmetic of fractions and sums. They have the disadvantage as objects for our discussion that the full development in both cases took centuries, and that pushing-together of this long development into an instant picture might make us believe that the resulting Piaget used observations of this kind to distinguish a stage of "concrete operations" from one of "formal thought". My own observation of professional mathematicians ("formal animals" par excellence if such creatures exist) confronted with the Edith-SusanLily problem is that they immediately begin, either to represent the girls by three fingers or by writing things down, using a symbol which imitates the nestability of boxes (namely "<"). From the point of view of practical cognitive psychology, "formal thought" is a philosophical hoax, what is in play is assimilation of new objects -often manipulable on paper -to the realm of that with which we are so familiar that it has become "concrete".
sham snapshot really represent exactly that which was vindicated by later formally based insights. Instead we may look at two real snapshots, one from the fourteenth and one from the eighteenth century. Afterwards we shall address two cases of excessive or delusive generosity, illustrating that the quotations from Goethe and Tom Lehrer apply also to artificial languages.
Honest generosity I: Dardi of Pisa
Our first case is Dardi of Pisa's proof of the least obvious of the sign rules, "less times less makes plus", from his Aliabraa argibra, apparently written in 1344, and probably borrowing from earlier sources even part of that which we do not recognize from elsewhere. 4 Ora te voio demostrar per numero como men viam fa più a zo che ogni fiada ch'el te vegniva in costruzion a moltiplicarme viame che tu vezi zertamente ch'el fa più, com'io te darò l'exenplo manifesto. 8 via 8 fa 64, e questo 8 si è 2m de 10, e a moltiplicar lo per l'altro 8, lo qual è ancora 2m de 10, die similmente far 64. Echo la prova. Moltiplica 10 via 10, fa 100, e 10 via 2m fa 20m, e l'altro 10 via 2m fa 40m, lo qual 40m traze da 100, e roman 60. Ora manca per conplir la moltiplication a moltiplicar 2m via 2m, monta 4 più, lo qual 4 più zonzi sovra 60, monta 64. E se 2m via 2m fosse 4m, questo 4m se doverave trazer der 60, resterave 56, e così parerave che 10m 2 via 10m 2 fesse 56, la qual cosa non è vera. E così etiandio se 2m via 2m fesse niente, la moltiplication de 10m 2 via 10m 2 vegnirave a far 60, la qual cosa è ancora false. Adunquam viam de necesità vien a far più.
In fairly literal translation but without abbreviations:
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Now I want to demonstrate by number how less times less makes plus, so that every times you have in a construction to multiply less times less you see with certainty that it makes plus, of which I shall give you an obvious example. 8 times 8 makes 64, and this 8 is 2 less than 10, and to multiply by the other 8, which is still 2 less than 10, it should similarly make 64. This is the proof. Multiply 10 by 10, it makes 100, and 10 times 2 less makes 20 less, and the other 10 times 2 less makes 40 less, which 40 less detract from 100, and there remains 60. Now it is left for the completion of the multiplication to multiply 2 less times 2 less, it amounts to 4 plus, which 4 plus join above 60, it amounts to 64. And if 2 less times two less had been 4 less, this 4 less should have been detracted from 60, and 56 would remain, and thus it would appear that 10 less 2 times 10 less two had been 56, which is not true. And so also if 2 less times 2 less had been nothing, then the multiplication of 10 less 2 times 10 less 2 would come to be 60, which is still false. Hence less times less by necessity comes to be plus.
This almost looks like a natural-language discussion, but the passage is followed by a diagram representing the genuine medium of the argument:
We do not know whether the particular proof is Dardi's invention, 6 [Sesiano 1988: 96 n. 14] 
From the multiplication of added in added comes nothing but added. From the multiplication of added in diminished comes nothing but diminished, and from the multiplication of diminished in added diminished. From the multiplication of diminished in diminished comes nothing but added. The diagram is equally abstract, and involves no numbers. No result therefore occurs, nor the two lines pointing to it; on the other hand, two horizontal lines that do not Whether it be his own or a borrowing, Dardi's argument for the sign rule was found convincing and was not forgotten. Luca Pacioli repeats it in the Summa de arithmetica [1494: 113 r ], now with the diagram in the margin, and with an explicit reference to the cross-multiplication; apart from Luca's verbosity (which allows us to see that he finds the very concept absurda and an abuse but none the less necessary -Pacioli, indeed, thinks in terms of negative, not merely subtractive numbers as does Dardi 9 ), the only innovation is that the alternative to the alternative is now (-2) (-2) = -2, not (-2) (-2) = 0. We may guess that the attempt of both authors to cover "all" possibilities and not only the ones that first had come intuitively to their mind (viz plus and less 4) reflects a wish to make "real" mathematics (we know nothing about Dardi's training, but Pacioli knew his Euclid well, he even published an edition of the Elements). As a matter of fact, even these attempted exhaustions of all possibilities are based on intuitions, inspired by things that sometimes happen in the kind of computations they knew (as revealed by the words in which they express them): either when a multiplication by something plus nothing is performed, or in a multiplication by 1.
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Dardi probably did not know, but his argument is almost in the style of classical analysis: in analysis, we assume that a solution exists and that it behaves as the objects with which we are already familiar; from this we derive what it must be. The only shortcoming (the typical shortcoming of intuitive thought) with respect to this methodological yardstick is that Dardi does not show that (-2) (-2) has to be +4, instead he shows that +4 fits while alternatives that come to his mind do not. He does not perform the ensuing synthesis (the step, we may say, from intuition to critique), which in this case would indeed imply a complete 9 This is also visible when he explains that a number of this kind is "less than zero and in consequence a debt". justification of the possibility of negative numbers. Only the nineteenth century provided that proof, but long before that it had been seen that reliance on the sign rules (and the ensuing operations with negative numbers) never led to contradictions.
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Honest generosity II: Euler
As a second example of generosity that turned out to be reliable we may look at two paragraphs from Euler's Introductio in analysin infinitorum [1748: I, 271-272]:
325. Quod si autem hoc productum &c.,
evolvatur, sequens prodibit series &c, 1 x x 2 2 x 3 2 x 4 3 x 5 4 x 6 5 x 7 6 x 8 8 x 9 10 x 10 in qua quisque coefficiens indicat, quot variis modis exponens ipsius x per additionem numerorum inaequalium oriri possit. Sic numerus 9 octo variis modis per additionem ex numeris inaequalibus formari potest: 9 = 9 9 = 8+1 9 = 7+2 9 = 6+3 9 = 6+2+1 9 = 5+4 9 = 5+3+1 9 = 4+3+2 326. Ut comparationem inter has formas instituamus, sit
qui factores cum omnes in P contineantur, dividatur P per PQ; erit
quae fractio si evolvatur, prodibit series, in qua quisque coëfficiens indicabit, quot variis modis exponens ipsius x per additionem ex numeris imparibus produci possit. Cum igitur haec expressio aequalis sit illi, quam in §. praecedente contemplati sumus, sequitur hinc istud theorema:
Quot modis datus numerus per additionem formari potest ex omnibus numeris integris inter se inaequalibus, totidem modis idem numerus formari poterit per additionem ex numeris tantum imparibus, sive aequalibus sive inaequalibus.
In translation: § 325. If, however, 12 one develops the product
as a series, then this will be:
, 1 x x 2 2 x 3 2 x 4 3 x 5 4 x 6 5 x 7 6 x 8 8 x 9 10 x 10 and here every coefficient indicates in how many ways the exponent of the corresponding power of x may arise from addition of unequal integer numbers. Thus the number 9 can be composed in 8 different ways by addition of unequal numbers, namely: 9 = 9 9 = 8+1 9 = 7+2 9 = 6+3 9 = 6+2+1 9 = 5+4 9 = 5+3+1 9 = 4+3+2 § 326. In order to compare now these two forms, let:
thus:
Since all factors of this product are also contained in P, then it follows, if P is divided by PQ:
and hence
from which fraction, if it is developed, one gets a series in which every coefficient indicates in how may different ways the exponent of the power of x in question may be produced from addition of odd numbers. As now this expression is the same as the one which we considered in the preceding paragraph, then this theorem follows: 12 The previous paragraph has developed the unending fraction
as an infinite series (my formulation), and shown that a n coincides 1 a 1 x a 2 x 2 a 3 x 3 with the number of different ways n can be written as a sum (3 thus as 3, as 2+1, and as 1+1+1).
Every number can be composed from odd numbers alone, be they equal, be they unequal, in exactly as many ways, as it can be formed by addition of all integer but mutually different numbers.
At first we observe (with some amazement, if we have not studied such matters before) that Euler's theorem is correct; secondly, that none of those who would have loved to know such wonderful properties of numbers in Antiquity or the Middle Ages (Islamic as well as Latin) had ever noticed them; thirdly, that only Euler's highly developed mathematics allowed their derivation -no everyday intuition in the style of would ever lead forward. The symbolic language -now far removed from the inspiration once received from the Maghreb mathematicians -had proven really generous. As a matter of facts, it gave Euler and his readers much more astonishing results by quite analogous means, for instance concerning the connection between the sequence of prime numbers and the ζ-function.
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On the other hand, it is obvious that Euler's arguments are not rigorous. Euler does not himself present the intuitive arguments that are needed, in a kind interpretation he leaves it to the intelligent reader to find them (but see below, note 14). If the very first step is pinned out, the argument has to run more or less as follows:
(1) The result of the multiplication must be of the form . -term from such terms that = n and 1 from all the other factors, that is, in as many ways i as n can be written as a sum where all i are different. i A very nice piece of analysis, also in the classical sense: we assume that the result of the infinite product exists, and that it can be found as a sum of partial products just in the way we are accustomed to -and that the infinity of the number of partial products where the sum of exponents is infinite is overruled by the infinitely small value which these terms have if only x is small. Finally, it is needed that two infinite power series can only be identical if all coefficients are pairwise identical -just as is the case for finite series, that is, for polynomials.
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The operations needed for showing the theorem about the partitions as well as the one about primes and ζ-function turned out to be justifiable in the nineteenth century; but in 1748 it asked for Euler's fine intuition not to end up in absurdities (and as we see in note 14, even Euler's intuition was not always sufficient).
Perilous generosity, or, set theory saved in extremis from addiction
Absurdities did result (together with wonderful results) from another intercourse with the infinite. Apparently, Georg Cantor's "Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre" [1895] moves on well-trodden paths. A "set" is explained (p. 481) to be any collection of well-determined, distinct 14 But woe, at an earlier point [Euler 1748 products which contain more than a finite number of factors different from 1 (and which are thus infinitely great!) are disregarded, and the product is "shown" to equal the sum 1+2+3+5+6+7+10+11+13+14+15+17+... of all natural numbers that are not divisible by the square of a prime number. In this case it is difficult to see what meaning to attribute to the result -which is hence beyond the categories of true and false. Only set theory allows an interpretation -viz ℵ = ℵ 0 ! objects, and its "potency" ("Mächtigkeit") or "cardinal number" results when our active intellect removes the particular characteristics and the order of the elements by an act of abstraction; the cardinal number is thus (p. 482) a set consisting of mere units deprived of all characteristics (except that of being distinct). All of this sounds perfectly Aristotelian, and should lead to no more problems than ancient Greek arithmetic. Evidently Cantor knew the techniques by which his nineteenth-century predecessors had derived the integers, the rational numbers and the real numbers from the natural numbers, that is, essentially from the Greek Anzahlen, and his arguments surrounding these are perfectly sound, in the sense that even shortcuts of the type "it is easily seen that" can be filled out by anybody possessing familiarity with these techniques; if intuition plays a role, then it is an intuition that can easily be made operational. Cantor is also quite aware that care has to be taken; he points out (p. 501) that a vicious circle in Veronese's definition of "equality" of transfinite numbers leads the latter to invent objects which "have no existence, if not that on the paper".
None the less, this first version of Cantor's theory of sets did not avoid the trouble of vicious circles, not apparent in the definitions but arising as unsuspected consequences. What happened?
Firstly, Cantor leaves behind the familiar ground of ancient arithmetic when he allows the objects which make up a set to be objects "for our perception or our thought". This seems to be an innocuous generalization of the monads making up an ancient Greek αριθµος (or no generalization at all, since no Greek philosopher seems ever to have excluded the counting of mental objects explicitly). As Cantor's reader finds out soon, however, even sets and transfinite cardinal numbers are meant to be objects that can be elements in sets; in consequence, Cantor is able to find the actual infinite, emphatically rejected by Aristotle. The reader also finds it to be supposed always possible (p. 493), if elements t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n-1 have been taken from a transfinite set T, "to take out yet another element t n " -in complete agreement with our experience with natural numbers (where a rule for doing so is easily invented, for instance to take t n = t 1 +t 2 +...+t n-1 +1). In both cases, intuition based on previous experience turned out to be problematic. As only too well known, sets of sets lead to paradoxes; Russell and Whitehead's theory of types tried to avoid them by prohibiting the collection of objects of different "type" into the same set, but if this is taken into account several of Cantor's proofs have to be reshaped with great care. 15 The possibility "to take out yet another element t n " without any need for specifying a rule for choosing it also turned out at Zermelo's closer investigation to be a postulate, the "axiom of choice", and no matter of course.
Delusive generosity, or, the failed extension of a semi-group
Though that was not his aim, Dardi's proof of the sign rule can be seen from a later point of view to allow the extension of the natural numbers organized with addition and multiplication into the ring of (similarly organized) integers. In this case, the generosity of his language gave him even more than he asked for (and Pacioli as much as he asked for since it was "necessary" albeit "absurd").
Almost contemporary with Dardi is an attempt to extend the semi-group of non-negative algebraic powers (organized with multiplication) into a group. In the Vatican manuscript Vat. Lat. 10488 we find the following:
Algebra Queste sono alchune ragioni assemprate di 1 libro fato per mano di Giovanni di Davizo de l'Abacho da Firenza schrito su quelo ad 15 setembre ani 1339, è questo 1424.
fol. 29v
Algebra These are some computations collected from a book made by the hand of Giovanni di Davizzo dell'Abacho from Florence written the 15th of September 1339, this is 1424.
Sapi che moltiplicare numero per chubo fa chubo e numero per per zenso fa zenso e numero per chosa fa chosa.
Know that to multiply number by cube makes a cube and number by censo makes censo and number by thing makes thing E più via più fa più e meno via meno fa più e più via meno fa meno And plus times plus makes plus and less times less makes plus and plus times less makes less e meno via più fa meno. and less times plus makes less. E sapi che una chose via una chosa fa 1 zenso e zenso via zenso fa zenso di zenso e cosa via zenso fa chubo e chubo via chubo fa chubo di chubo e zenso via chubo fa zenso di chubo.
And know that a thing times a thing makes a censo and censo times censo makes censo of censo and thing times censo makes cube and cube times cube makes cube of cube and censo times cube makes censo of cube.
E sapi partire numero per chosa viene numero e partire numero per zenso viene e partire chosa per zenso viene numero e partire numero per chubo viene chubica e partire chosa per chubo viene e partire zenso per chubo viene numero e partire numero per zenso di zenso viene di e partire chosa per zenso di zenso viene chubica e partire zenso per zenso di zenso viene e partire chubo per zenso di zenso viene numero
And know that dividing number by thing gives number and dividing number by censo gives root and dividing thing by censo gives number and dividing number by cube gives cube root and dividing thing by cube gives root and dividing censo by cube gives number and dividing number by censo of censo gives root of root and dividing thing by censo of censo gives cube root and dividing censo by censo of censo gives root and dividing cube by censo of censo gives number fol. 30r e partire numero per chubo di chubo viene chubicha di chubica e partire chosa per chubo di chubo viene di chubica e partire zenso per chubo di chubo viene di e partire chubo per chubo di chubo viene chubicha e partire zenso di zenso per chubo di chubo viene e partire zenso di chubo per chubo viene numero ----zenso* e partire numero per zenso di zenso di zenso di zenso viene di di di fol. 30r and dividing number by cube of cube gives cube root of cube root and dividing thing by cube of cube gives root of cube root and dividing censo by cube of cube gives root of root and dividing cube by cube of cube gives cube root and dividing censo of censo by cube of cube gives root and dividing censo of cube by cube gives number ----censo* and dividing number by censo of censo of censo of censo gives root of root of e partire numero per chubo di chubo di chubo di chubo viene chubicha di chubicha di chubicha di chubicha.
root of root and dividing number by cube of cube of cube of cube gives cube root of cube root of cube root of cube root.
Se voi moltiplichare per , moltiplicha di 9 via di 9, dì 9 via 9 fa 81, e farà di 81, et e fata.
Dividere di 40 per di 8, parti 40 per 8, viene 5, e di 5 sia.
Parti di 25 per di 9, parti 25 per 9, viene di 2 e 7 / 9 , fata.
Se voi moltiplichare 7 via --^meno^di 6 per se, fa 7 via 7, fa 49, giungi 6 chon 〈49, fa〉 55, e 7 via 6 fa 42, poi moltiplicha 7 via 42, fa 294, e moltiplicha poi 4 via 294, fa 1176, dicho che 55 meno di 1176 farà moltiplichato 7 meno di 6 fata --per se, fata.
If you want to multiply root by root, multiply root of 9 times root of 9, say, 9 times 9 makes 81, and it will make the root of 81, and it is done. To divide root of 40 by root of 8, divide 40 by 8, it gives 5, and root of 5 let it be. To divide root of 25 by root of 9, divide 25 by 9, it gives root of 2 7 /9, done. If you want to multiply 7 less root of 6 by itself, do 7 times 7, it makes 49, join 6 with 〈49, it makes〉 55, and 7 times 6 makes 42, then multiply 7 times 42, it makes 294, and multiply then 4 times 294, it makes 1176, I say that 55 less root of 1176 will it make when 7 less root of 6 is multiplied by itself, done.
fol. 30v
Se voi trarre di 8 per [sic] di 18 fa 8 via 18, fa 144, sua è 12, e di, 12 e 12 fa 24, e dì, 8 e 18 fa 26, trai 24 di 26, resta ---e di 2 rimarà, fata.
Se voi giungere di 8 chon di 18, fa 8 via 18, fa 144, sua è 12, e dì, 12 e 12 fa 24, e dì, 8 e 18 fa 26, e giungni 24 e 26, fa 50, e di 50 sarà il numero.
Se voi moltiplichare 5 e di 4 via 5 meno di 4, fa chosì e dì, 5 via 5 fa 25, e dì, 5 via di 4, fa chosì, recha 5 a , fa 25, e fa di 25 via di 4, fa di 100, e fa 5 via meno di 4, fa meno di 100, resta pure 25, ora tra 4 di 25, resta 21, e 21 fano.
If you want to detract root of 8 from root of 18, do 8 times 18, it makes 144, its root is 12, and say, 8 and 18 makes 26, detract 24 from 26, and root of 2 will remain, done. It you want to join root of 8 with root of 18, do 8 times 18, it makes 144, its root is 12, and say, 12 and 12 makes 24, and say, 8 and 18 makes 26, and join 24 and 26, it makes 50, and root of 50 will the number be. If you want to multiply 5 and root of 4 times 5 less root of 4, do thus and say, 5 times 5 makes 25, and say, 5 times root of 4, do thus, bring 5 to root, it makes 25, and do root of 25 times root of 4, it makes root of 100, and make 5 times less root of 4, it Se voi moltiplichare 7 e di 9 via 7 e di 9, fa 7 via 7, fa 49, poni quel 9, ài 58, e 9 via 49 fa 441, moltiplicha per 4, fa 1764, ài che farà 58 e di 1764 che è 42, fata. e partire zenso di chubo per chubo di chubo viene numero. Somewhere in the process, this had become e partire zenso di chubo per chubo viene numero. Noticing the error, somebody -presumably the writer of the manuscript -discovered that this was wrong, and stated the correct result. This is followed by 19 rules for solving reduced equations of the first, second, third and fourth degree.
The extract starts, in modern terms, by presenting through examples 17 the semi-group of positive powers of the unknown, designated a thing/cosa (which we may represent by t). Its square is a censo -which we (taking advantage of the arithmetization of powers introduced by Chuquet and Bombelli) are able to designate by t 2 , whereas t 3 is a cube. The designations for the higher powers are composed multiplicatively, without nesting (even though nesting is suggested 17 Not very orderly, as we observe; and in the middle of the presentation we find the sign rules.
by the use of the genitive 18 ). The censo of censo is thus t 2 t 2 = t 4 , the cube of cube is t 3 t 3 = t 6 , the censo of cube is t 2 t 3 , etc.
Once we know that, all products t m t n are seen to be expressed correctly, and so is the only division t m ÷t n where m>n≥0 (censo of cube by cube). The semigroup of non-negative powers is thus treated coherently. In contrast, divisions t m ÷t n where m<n look strange. However, they are quite systematic. If we forget about the meaning of the words "root" and "cube root" and take to be the inverse of a censo (i.e., to be t -2 ), cubica to be that of a cube (i.e., to be t -3 ) and their composition to be multiplicative, everything turns out to be meaningful, except in cases where n = m+1 and where the outcome of the division is thus t -1 . Here, Giovanni and his copyist assert that the result is number, that is, of power t 0 . Apparently, a hunch of arithmetization interferes, in the sense that is associated with the number 2, and conceptualized as a "second root", and cubica with "third root". "First root", not known as a standard operation, is then identified with the number.
Giovanni thus has not thought through the matter; since every abbacus master knew, then even he must have been aware that if a÷b = c, then c b = a, and therefore, if "dividing number by thing gives number", then "number by thing" makes number, not thing as he has stated earlier. Moreover, he can be assumed to have known well what root really means, since the subsequent section of the arithmetic of roots is fully correct and makes use in several places of the rule √n √n = n. He can never have used his daring extension of the semi-group for any practical purpose, since then its inherent contradictions would have exploded it. In the most literal (but also in the Piagetian) sense, it stays at the intuitive level, and never reaches that of operatory thought.
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This holds not only for Giovanni. As we see, his text was copied in 1424 by 18 Evidently, Giovanni's Italian terminology follows traditions shaped in other languages and grammatical structures. Both Diophantos and the Arabic traditions (for whose probably connection in the designation of higher powers I shall not argue in this place) also use multiplication, not nesting; actually, this choice facilitates the production of names for all powers -when nesting without arithmetization took over (for instance in Pacioli Sappi che cosa via cosa fa censo, et cosa via censo fa cubo, et censo via censo fa censo di censo, et cosa via cubo fa censo di censo, et cubo via cubo fa cubo di censo [sic] , et censo via cubo fa censo di cubo.
Sappi che a partire numero per cosa ne vene numero, et partire cosa per censo ne vene numero, e partire numero per censo ne ve' radici, et partire censo per cubo ne vene numero, et partire numero per censo di censo ne vene radici de radici, et partire cosa per censo di censo ne vene radici cuba, et partire censo per censo di censo ne vene radici, et partire cubo per censo di censo ne vene numero, e partire numero per cubo di cubo ne vene radici cubicha 〈di radice cubica〉, e partire cosa per cubo di cubo ne vene radici 〈di radice〉 cubica, et partire censo per cubo di cubo ne vene radici de radici, et a partire chubo per cubo di cubo ne vene radici cubica, et partire censo di censo per cubo di cubo ne vene radici, et partire censo de cubo per cubo di chubo ne v[e]ne numero, et a partire numero per cubo ven radici cuba, e a partire cosa per cubo ven radici, et partire numero per censo di censo di censo ven radici de radici de radici, et partire numero per cubo de cubo di cubo ven radici cuba de radici cuba de radici cuba.
As we see, the rules are almost exactly as those in the quotation from Giovanni di Davizzo (confirming, by the way, the hypothesis of note (*)). This leaves little doubt that Giovanni di Davizzo is Piero's ultimate source.
20 But as we also see, the order of the rules is not the same. Either Piero himself or, rather, some intermediary 21 must thus have understood the project well enough to tinker with it, though not well enough to see that it was a nonsensical blind alley. One strand of abbacus mathematics thus walked up and down this alley for more than a century without discovering that it led nowhere. 22 Piero, claiming to 20 Other early Italian algebra writings speak against the possibility that Giovanni himself has copied the passage wholesale from a predecessor although they do not exclude it. What can apparently be excluded is a borrowing from Arabic algebra -at least since alKarajī, the inverses of algebraic powers had been dealt with coherently.
21 Indeed, the passage in question is found almost verbatim in Giovanni Guiducci's Libro d'arismetricha from c. 1465 -see [Giusti 1993: 205] .
write a treatise about "certain abbacus things that are necessary for merchants" [ed. Arrighi 1970: 39] , could do so because neither he nor any merchant had the least operatory need for it.
Final meditations
What do these examples teach us? First of all, that the artificial languages of mathematics confirm another maxim pronounced by Goethe's Mephisto (concerning theology, also presented by him as a kind of artificial language) (Faust, I, 1995-99 that is, they allow us to go beyond that which we grasp in fully operatory concepts (Begriffe) and project our thought into the unknown. This is not all there is to their generosity, but it may be their most creative as well as their most treacherous aspect. In cases where no real jump is made because no operations are implied that are not already tested (as in the case of Dardi's proof), no danger is involved. When the jump is really one, only a process of making operational the suggested concepts, of trying them out in (theoretical) practice (thus doing with the artificial "vocabulary" and its grammar what we all did with those of basic natural language between the ages of five and ten years) can distinguish such entities which "exist only on paper" from such as are or can be made None the less, the mistaken extension of the semi-group survived Pacioli's Summa. Giovanni's first 15 rules are still found, in exactly the same order, in Bento Fernandes' Tratado da arte de arismetica from 1555; some of the wrong rules for solving higher-degree equations are also repeated by Fernandes. For both, see Silva 2006: 14, 30-33] . 23 For just where fails the comprehension, A word steps promptly in as deputy. With words 'tis excellent disputing; Systems to words 'tis easy suiting; On words 'tis excellent believing; [...] . (trans. Bayard Taylor, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14591/14591-h/14591-h.htm#III). coherently meaningful; 24 where no such "active mathematician's practice" takes place, inventions like that of Giovanni di Davizzo (or that of Euler referred to in note 14) may survive indefinitely long, guaranteed as they seem to be by their expressibility in the venerated language of mathematics. Mephisto was certainly right that the same may happen in theology -not to speak of philosophy, yet another venerated artificial language (or cluster of languages) which has served to legitimate much addictive nonsense; but these are different topics.
